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1 
THE “PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION” BAN: 
HEALTH CARE IN THE SHADOW OF 
CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
PANEL II, THE PATH AHEAD: LEGAL 
CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES 
The following is an edited transcript of Talcott Camp’s 
presentation on the federal so-called “partial-birth abortion” ban. 
Ms. Camp’s comments consisted of an informal overview and 
analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding Gonzales v. Carhart,  
127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). 
I‘m really honored to follow that last panel of physician-
providers, because those folks are heroes. They are keeping 
women safe and managing to do so without violating that hideous 
law in the face of a Supreme Court decision that is just shameful.  
This is the story of the Federal Abortion Ban, the so-called 
―partial-birth abortion‖ ban.1 It‘s a story that starts long before 
this federal law was passed, and it‘s a story in which you want to 
keep your eye on two bouncing balls: (1) Justice Kennedy‘s vote, 
and (2) how the Court treats women‘s decision-making capacity.  
I.  ROE AND DOE 
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade2 and Doe v. 
                                                          
  Deputy Director, American Civil Liberties Union Reproductive 
Freedom Project.  
 1 Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2008).  
 2 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–66 (1973). 
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Bolton3 that the Constitution protects a woman‘s right to choose 
to terminate her pregnancy. The Court established the right as 
fundamental and made clear that abortion restrictions were 
therefore subject to strict scrutiny, the toughest level of review. 
Most abortion restrictions passed after Roe were struck down 
as unconstitutional, but a couple of important ones were, sadly, 
upheld. First, under Roe and Doe,  the Court upheld restrictions 
on low-income women‘s access to abortion.4 This allowed states 
and the federal government to deny coverage for abortion 
services in Medicaid programs, even though those programs 
covered pre-natal care and labor and delivery services. Second, 
the Court upheld state-mandated parental involvement in young 
women‘s abortion decisions. 5 These are notable exceptions: in 
those days the Court generally struck down the kinds of 
restrictions we now see all over the country, such as biased 
counseling requirements and state-mandated delays.6 The Court 
struck those restrictions down under the strict scrutiny standard 
established in Roe and Doe.7 
What was not so good about Roe was the Court‘s almost 
exclusive focus on physician discretion.8 Don‘t get me wrong: I 
love physician discretion. But the Roe Court focused on physician 
discretion almost to the exclusion of the woman‘s decision-
making power, and Roe therefore doesn‘t reflect the extent to 
which the ability to make the decision is central to women‘s lives. 
                                                          
 3 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 201 (1973).  
4 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464 (1977).  
 5 See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (outlining constitutional 
requirements for parental involvement mandates).  
 6 See, e.g. ,  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 881–87 (1992) (upholding Pennsylvania biased counseling and 
mandatory delay requirement); see also NARAL Pro-Choice America, Fast 
Facts – Biased Counseling & Mandatory Delays, http://www.naral.org/choice-
action-center/in_your_state/who-decides/fast-facts/biased_counseling.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2008) (listing current state laws).  
 7 See, e.g. ,  Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,  
476 U.S. 747, 759–65 (1986). 
 8 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 163, 165 (1973).   
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There was almost an assumption in Roe that a woman who was 
unmarried and pregnant would of course want to avoid the 
seemingly immutable shame of so-called ―unwed motherhood.‖ 
So in that sense, Roe does not reflect the world I‘d like to see, in 
which women—whether single or married, straight or lesbian, 
low income or middle class—are able to choose to terminate a 
pregnancy or continue it,  and, regardless of their choice, enjoy 
our support, rather than our shaming judgment. But, hey—Roe 
established strict scrutiny, and I‘ll take that any day.  
II.  CASEY 
In 1992, the Supreme Court essentially demoted the right to 
choose to terminate a pregnancy in Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey.9 Rather than strict scrutiny, restrictions on abortion are 
now judged under Casey‘s far more deferential ―undue burden‖ 
standard.10 Under Casey‘s undue burden standard, the Court has 
upheld restrictions that it struck down under Roe,  such as biased 
counseling and mandatory delay requirements. 11 In Casey itself,  
the Court upheld essentially every provision of Pennsylvania‘s 
omnibus abortion regulation, with one exception: the Court struck 
down the requirement that married women notify their husbands 
before terminating a pregnancy.12 
As an interesting aside, before Casey reached the Supreme 
Court, the case was before a panel of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 13 The panel did essentially what the 
Supreme Court would later do: it upheld everything except the 
spousal notification requirement.14 One judge on the panel 
dissented from the decision to strike the spousal notice 
                                                          
 9 See Casey,  505 U.S. at 833, 872, 876–78. 
10 See id.  
 11 See id.  at 881–83, 887. 
12 Id.  at 893–94, 898. 
 13 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.  Casey, 947 
F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991). 
14 Id.  at 710–11. 
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requirement: then Judge, now Justice, Samuel Alito. 15 
So back to the Supreme Court: while demoting the right and 
upholding a bevy of new restrictions was awful, there was an 
upside to Casey as well. The Court treated women‘s decision-
making as central. The controlling plurality opinion in Casey 
said: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one‘s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.  Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State. 16 
Now, there are certainly other parts of Casey that are 
problematic, including certain other passages that also treat 
women‘s decision-making.17 But in that passage, the Casey 
plurality said—I think quite beautifully—that at the center of 
reproductive liberty is not merely the ability to terminate versus 
continue a pregnancy, but the ability to form the beliefs that 
undergird that decision. That seems to me to be a happy evolution 
from the tenor of Roe.  
In Casey,  Justice Kennedy cast the critical vote that made that 
opinion the controlling plurality opinion. So keep your eye on 
Justice Kennedy. 
III.  STENBERG V.  CARHART (CARHART I) 
In 2000, eight years after Casey was decided, and applying 
Casey‘s undue burden standard, the Supreme Court struck down 
Nebraska‘s so-called ―partial-birth abortion‖ ban in Stenberg v. 
Carhart,  or Carhart I18 (as distinct from last year‘s decision, 
Gonzales v. Carhart,  or Carhart II19).  
                                                          
15 Id.  at 720 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
16 Casey,  505 U.S. at 851. 
17 See, e.g. ,  id.  at 883 (permitting state to enact laws designed to 
―ensur[e]‖ that the woman‘s ―decision . .  .  is mature‖).  
 18 Stenberg v. Carhart (Carhart I), 530 U.S. 914 (2000).  
 19 Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610 
(2007).  
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To provide some extremely brief background on abortion: 
there are a little over one million abortions every year in this 
country.20 About 90% occur in the first trimester. 21 The other 
10% occur in the second trimester,22 a pre-viability period 
consisting of the fourth, fifth, and sixth months of pregnancy, 
when the fetus is not able to survive outside the uterus. Of those 
10% of abortions in this country that occur in the second 
trimester, over 95% are dilation and evacuation procedures 
(D&Es),23 which you heard about in the first panel. 24 
So, back again to the Supreme Court. In Carhart I,  applying 
Casey‘s undue burden standard, the Court struck the Nebraska 
ban on two grounds.25 First, it was broad.26 Rather than restrict 
only the intact variation of D&E, the ban potentially reached all 
D&Es, and would therefore constitute an almost complete ban on 
second-trimester, pre-viability procedures. The Nebraska law, for 
example, did not include the word ―intact.‖27 
Second, the Court struck the ban because even if it had been 
narrowly targeted to intact D&E procedures, it would have been 
unconstitutional because it lacked a health exception.28 
How did the Court reach that decision? First of all,  the 
                                                          
 20 Rachel K. Jones et al.,  Abortion in the United States: Incidence and 
Access to Services, 2005,  40 PERSP.  ON SEXUAL & REPROD.  HEALTH 1, 9,  
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/4000608.pdf (estimating that there 
were 1.2 million induced abortions in the U.S. in 2005).   
 21 LILO T.  STRAUSS ET AL. ,  ABORTION SURVEILLANCE -- UNITED STATES,  
2004 at Table 18 (MMWR Surveillance Summaries. 56: 1-33, 2007), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5609a1.htm.  
 22 Id.  
23 Id.  
 24 As the morning panelists did not submit comments for publication, see 
Brief of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondents, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) 
(Nos. 05-380, 1382), 2006 WL 2867888 (describing D&E procedures) 
[hereinafter Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents].  
 25 Carhart I,  530 U.S. 914, 930 (2000).  
 26 Id.  
27 Id.  at 938–39. 
28 Id.  at 937–38. 
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physicians who challenged the law on behalf of themselves and 
their patients had shown substantial medical authority 
demonstrating that the law would endanger women‘s health. For 
example, the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG) submitted an amicus brief, a very 
beautiful amicus brief, explaining why this law would harm 
women‘s health.29 Yet the Defendant—the Nebraska Attorney 
General—had indeed shown what you might call a ―tie.‖30 He had 
shown that there was disagreement within the medical community 
about whether banning these procedures would endanger women. 
He didn‘t show nearly the substantial medical authority that the 
plaintiff-physicians did, but he certainly showed some medical 
disagreement.31 
The Court held that when there is such a ―tie,‖ the 
Constitution requires erring on the side of protecting women‘s 
health.32 A ―tie‖ goes in favor of women‘s health. That was the 
Court‘s reasoning in striking the Nebraska ban for lack of a 
health exception in 2000.  
So, on those two grounds—the breadth of the Nebraska ban 
and its lack of a health exception—the Court applied Roe,  Doe, 
and Casey,  and held that Casey‘s undue burden standard required 
striking down the ban.33 That was a 5-4 decision. 
Justice Kennedy, whose vote in Casey had made the undue 
burden standard controlling, dissented in Carhart I.  He insisted 
that Casey didn‘t require striking the Nebraska ban.34 Applying 
Casey correctly, he said, would result in upholding the Nebraska 
ban. 
Justice Scalia also dissented. He agreed with Justice Kennedy 
that the Nebraska ban should have been held constitutional, but 
                                                          
 29 See Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Carhart I,  530 U.S. 914 (2000) (No. 99-830), 2000 WL 340117. 
 30 Carhart I,  530 U.S. at 933–36. 
31 Id. at 937–38. 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  at 921–22, 930–31. 
34 Id. at 956–79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  
CAMP 4/16/2009  1:58 PM 
 THE “PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION” BAN 7 
 
he disagreed about the applicable standard and what it meant. 35 
Scalia said that the majority was right: that applying Casey‘s 
undue burden standard did indeed require striking the ban. And 
that is why, he argued, the Court should overturn Casey.36 So 
Scalia agreed with the majority in Carhart I that Casey required 
striking the ban, but that led him to conclude that Casey should 
be overturned. 
Let‘s take a slight diversion from reproductive rights cases. 
Three years after Carhart I,  the Court issued its decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas,  which struck down Texas‘s sodomy ban. 37 
Lawrence overturned Bowers v. Hardwick, a 1986 decision 
upholding a Georgia sodomy ban as constitutional.38 So the 2003 
Lawrence decision overturned Bowers,  which was almost 20 
years old at the time the Court issued Lawrence.  
Justice Kennedy wrote the decision in Lawrence.  In 
overturning Bowers,  he said: ―Two principal cases decided after 
Bowers cast its holding into even more doubt . .  .  .  In explaining 
the respect the Constitution demands for autonomy of the person 
in making these choices, we stated as follows . .  .  .‖39 He then 
quoted Casey as one of the two principal decisions that cast doubt 
on the constitutionality of criminal sodomy bans. 40 What part of 
Casey does he quote? Exactly that part I read a few minutes ago: 
At the heart of liberty is the right to define one‘s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they 
formed under compulsion of the State. 41  
So with great appreciation, Justice Kennedy quoted the loftiest 
rhetoric from Casey,  the part that talks about the woman‘s 
                                                          
35 See id. at 953–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
36 Id.    
 37 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).  
 38 Id. at 578; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  
39 Lawrence,  539 U.S. at 573–74. 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  at 574 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.  
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).  
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decision-making capacity that is central to reproductive liberty. 
But just watch what Justice Kennedy does next. 
IV.  GONZALES V.  CARHART (CARHART II) 
In Gonzales v. Carhart (Carhart II), four years after striking 
the sodomy ban in Lawrence and seven years after striking the 
Nebraska abortion ban in Carhart I,  the Court upheld the Federal 
Abortion Ban in an opinion written by none other than Justice 
Kennedy.42 And that ruling, also a 5-4 decision, is what has 
brought us here today.  
After the Lawrence decision, where Justice Kennedy quoted 
Casey so appreciatively, I had confidence that he was not going 
to vote to overturn Casey.  But I had a sense we were going to 
lose Carhart II,  even though we had won the Nebraska abortion 
ban case seven years before.  
What had changed from 2000, when the Court reviewed the 
Nebraska ban, to 2007, when it reviewed the federal ban? First,  
Chief Justice Rehnquist had been replaced by John Roberts,  
which did not change the outcome: Rehnquist dissented in 2000, 
voting to uphold the Nebraska ban,43 just as Roberts would vote 
to uphold the federal ban in 2007. However, Justice O‘Connor 
had been replaced by Samuel Alito, who, recall, as a judge on the 
Third Circuit had voted to uphold Pennsylvania‘s spousal 
notification requirement in 1991.44 While I thought he would vote 
to uphold the federal ban, which he did, and I thought we were 
going to lose, I didn‘t think we were going to lose quite so badly.  
In Carhart II,  Justice Kennedy wrote the Court‘s decision 
upholding the Federal Abortion Ban in the face of the same two 
claims based on which the Court had struck the Nebraska ban: 
that it was broad and that it lacked a health exception. 45 The 
Court upheld the federal ban on both grounds, and yet stated that 
                                                          
 42 Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. 1610, 1639 (2007).  
 43 Carhart I,  530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
44 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 947 
F.2d 682, 719 (3d Cir. 1991) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
45 See Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1627, 1639.  
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it was not overturning any precedent, including Carhart I. 46 
Indeed, the Court stated that it was simply applying Casey.47 
First, the breadth claim: The physician-plaintiffs who 
challenged the federal law claimed that it reached much more 
than intact D&E. This law, like the Nebraska law, did not include 
the word ―intact,‖48 and the Court did not read the word ―intact‖ 
into it.  It is true that there are many places in the decision that 
distinguish between intact D&E and what Justice Kennedy calls 
―standard D&E,‖49 and I think we can assume that ―standard‖ 
generally means ―not intact.‖ And doctors and the attorneys who 
advise them should get as much mileage as possible out of that 
distinction, because it does provide some protection. 
Unfortunately, though, there is also this: ―The Act excludes 
most D&Es in which the fetus is removed in pieces, not intact.‖50 
It is difficult to know which ones are on the right side of the line 
and which ones are on the wrong side of the line. ―Most‖ does 
not mean ―all‖ and the decision gives no indication of just where 
the line is. 
Now, on the question of whether that holding on breadth 
overturned any precedent: The Court said that it did not because 
the federal law was in fact narrower than the Nebraska law.51 In 
light of the wording of the two statutes and their interaction with 
actual medical practice, that reasoning is not convincing, but it is 
understandable: the Nebraska and federal bans are indeed worded 
differently. 
On the health holding, however, the Court‘s insistence that it 
overturned no precedent is a tougher stretch.52 The Court upheld 
the federal law, without a health exception, notwithstanding that 
the justices recognized the same ―tie‖ they had found in the 
                                                          
46 See generally id.  
47 Id.  at 1627. 
 48 See id.  at 1624; Carhart I,  530 U.S. at 921–22. 
49 See, e.g. ,  Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1621–23, 1627, 1629, 1631–32, 
1634–35. 
50 Id.  at 1629 (emphasis added). 
51 See id. at 162931. 
52 See id.  at 1632, 163637. 
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earlier case.53 The physician-plaintiffs showed substantial medical 
authority that the law shamefully endangered women, including 
again the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 54 
as well as physicians, including the plaintiffs themselves, from 
leading medical schools across the country. 
But the government showed disagreement, creating that ―tie.‖ 
Again, the government‘s burden was not nearly as heavy as the 
physician-plaintiffs‘. The government didn‘t have to show 
substantial medical authority. All they had to show was 
disagreement, which they did: they showed some doctors who 
disagreed with the plaintiffs‘ substantial medical authority. So far 
this sounds like Carhart I,  which struck the Nebraska law. 
However, in Carhart II the Court changed the rules.55 A ―tie‖ no 
longer goes in favor of women‘s health. The Constitution no 
longer requires us to err on the side of making sure women are 
safe. Now, in the presence of a ―tie,‖ Congress can ban whatever 
it decides to ban. 
Most appallingly, to my mind, the Court wrote that ―if some 
procedures have different risks than others, it does not follow that 
the State is altogether barred from imposing reasonable 
regulations.‖56 In other words, if procedure A is riskier than 
procedure B, that alone does not stop Congress from banning B,  
forcing women to undergo the riskier procedure A. 
There are other places in the decision that imply that the 
Court perhaps didn‘t believe there was actually a difference in 
safety at issue in this case.57 This sentence says, however, that as 
a constitutional matter, it would not matter if there were.  
So in light of what seems to be a clear change in the rules—a 
―tie‖ no longer goes in favor of women‘s health—the Court‘s 
statement that it overturned no precedent is, as I said before, a 
                                                          
53 See id.  at 163537. 
54 See Brief for ACOG as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007) (Nos. 05-380, 05-1382), 2006 
WL 2867888. 
 55 See Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1637. 
 56 Id.  at 1638. 
57 See id.  at 1632, 1635–36, 1637. 
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stretch.58 It‘s tough to square the health exception holding in 
Carhart II,  which upheld the Federal Abortion Ban, with thirty 
years of precedent from Roe59 and Doe60 to Colautti61 and 
Danforth62 and Thornburgh63 and Casey64 and Carhart I,65 which 
made clear that the state cannot endanger women when it 
regulates abortion, and that the physicians‘ paramount 
consideration must always remain the woman‘s health. It is tough 
to square, but that‘s what the Court said—that it was just applying 
the same Casey undue burden standard that the Court had applied 
in Carhart I.66 Again, inasmuch as that is what the Court said, it 
is the job of advocates for reproductive justice to insist every way 
we can that the health-protective language in those prior cases 
remains good law. 
What about Justice Scalia? Recall that in Carhart I,  his dissent 
agreed with the majority of the Court on one point: that Casey 
required striking the Nebraska ban (meaning, in Scalia‘s view, 
that Casey should be overturned).67 So where was he in Carhart 
II,  where Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion reasoning that the 
federal ban should be upheld because it was perfectly consistent 
with Casey? Did Scalia write a separate opinion, clarifying that 
the federal law should be upheld, but that doing so was 
inconsistent with Casey? 
No, he didn‘t, and one might wonder why: why would Justice 
Scalia write the dissent he wrote in Carhart I,  and yet sign on to 
                                                          
58 Id.  at 1632, 1636–37. 
59 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150, 16364 (1973).  
60 See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).  
 61 See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387, 400–01 (1979).  
 62 See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
78–79 (1976).  
63 See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 
U.S. 747, 770–71 (1986).  
64 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833, 860, 879–80 (1992).  
65 See Carhart I,  530 U.S. 914, 936–38 (2000). 
66 Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. 1610, 1636–37, 1639 (2007).  
67 Carhart I,  530 U.S. at 953–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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the opinion Justice Kennedy wrote in Carhart II? Maybe he had 
just been reading Emerson early in 2007, something about a 
foolish consistency being the hobgoblin of little minds?68 But 
perhaps—and this is pure speculation on my part—it has 
something to do with someone on the Court wanting a clean 5-4 
decision, with a clear majority behind the reasoning, rather than a 
splintered decision. 
A final point on precedent: like the question of why Scalia 
didn‘t write separately in Carhart II,  I am happy to hazard 
guesses as to why the Court was so dismissive of women‘s 
health, and yet said that it overturned none of the precedent that 
is so protective of women‘s health. While that seeming oddness is 
galling and scary, the scariest thing is how the Court referred to 
Casey as authority. In 2003, Justice Kennedy‘s opinion for the 
Court in Lawrence had quoted Casey so appreciatively, but the 
opinion he wrote for the Court in Carhart II refers to Casey as 
follows: ―Under the principles accepted as controlling 
here . .  .  .‖69 Accepted by whom? Accepted as controlling? Not 
reaffirmed, let alone strongly reaffirmed, as the Court had done 
in Carhart I?70 No, none of that. ―Under the principles accepted 
as controlling here,‖ the federal ban ―would be unconstitutional‖ 
if it violated Casey‘s undue burden standard.71 Yikes! 
So I want to leave you with two points about the grounds on 
which the Carhart II Court upheld the law—the state interests that 
the Court said justified this ban. The first is the Court‘s statement 
that ―the government ‗has an interest in protecting the integrity 
and ethics of the medical profession.‘‖72 I would have thought 
that protecting the integrity of the medical profession meant 
making sure doctors can always practice with their patients‘ best 
medical interests at heart. But you know, they didn‘t consult me 
                                                          
68 See RALPH WALDO EMERSON,  Self-Reliance,  in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 
45, 58 (1841).  
 69 Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1632. 
70 Carhart I,  530 U.S. at 931, 938. 
71 Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1632. 
72 Id.  at 1633 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 
(1997)).  
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when they wrote this opinion. The terrifying thing is that a state 
interest in protecting medical ethics is potentially limitless as a 
justification for banning modes of abortion, as this ban purported 
to do. If the fact that some people think a particular procedure or 
variant of a procedure is ugly, shocking, or disturbing is enough 
to ban that procedure, then the right to abortion will soon be 
gone, because there is no procedure that‘s not disturbing to some 
people. But whether some or even many people are disturbed is 
not the measure of constitutional rights. If it were, the notion of 
constitutional rights as protected from majoritarian sentiment 
would be meaningless. 
Second, in its discussion of state interests, the Court wrote, 
―Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond 
of love the mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this 
reality as well.‖73 The Court further stated, ―While we find no 
reliable data to measure the phenomenon . .  .  .‖74 Okay. Any law 
student who has recently taken Evidence is familiar with the 
standards for admitting expert testimony set forth in Daubert75 
and Kumho Tire.76 It is safe to say that the following statement by 
the Court does not reflect that jurisprudence: ―While we find no 
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems 
unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their 
choice to abort .  .  .  .  Severe depression and loss of self-esteem 
can follow.‖77  
You‘d think there would then be a citation to a learned 
treatise here, but no. Simply ―unexceptionable to conclude.‖78 
Now, I don‘t in any way dismiss the experiences of some women 
that are very complicated after abortion. There are women who 
have spoken of extreme sadness. There are women who have 
                                                          
73 Id.  at 1634. 
 74 Id.   
 75 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (setting 
standard for admissibility of expert testimony).  
76 See Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) 
(applying standards articulated in Daubert).  
77 Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007).  
78 Id.  
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abortions and are later depressed—which is not to say that 
abortion causes those experiences: the greatest indicator of 
whether you will suffer depression or other emotional health 
difficulties after an abortion is your vulnerability to, and 
experience of, those illnesses before the abortion. 79 But while I 
don‘t dismiss anybody‘s lived experience, the idea that abortion 
causes severe mental illness is so offensively lacking in 
evidentiary foundation that it is really hard to swallow. 
But even more important in the Court‘s invocation of this so-
called state interest is how the Court treats women‘s decision-
making. Remember that other bouncing ball, aside from Justice 
Kennedy‘s vote? Women‘s decision-making was essentially 
invisible in Roe.  We saw it in a complicated but nonetheless very 
beautifully articulated way in Casey.80 And then here, in Carhart 
II,  we see it trashed and denigrated, because it is women‘s very 
decision-making power that Justice Kennedy says women need to 
be protected from,81 citing women‘s need to be protected (by the 
state) from their own decisions as justifying this awful restriction.  
This is, in sum, a very scary decision, and I leave it to my 
colleagues on this panel to tell us about the way forward from 
here. 
 
                                                          
79 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION,  REPORT OF THE APA TASK 
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION 68–70 (2008), available at 
http://www.apa.org/releases/abortion-report.pdf.  
 80 See, e.g. ,  Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).  
 81 See, e.g. ,  Carhart II,  127 S. Ct. at 1634.  
